“History has never known such a decisive battle with such unusual results” (Admiral of the Fleet I. S. Isakov)
The Industrial Revolution of the mid-19th century led to unprecedented changes in military affairs: new technical means of warfare meant the end of the concept of the “armed nation” put forward by the French Revolution, and the birth of the doctrine of “nations at war”, which has not lost its relevance to this day. The first armed conflict of the new era is considered to be the Crimean War (another name is the Eastern War) of 1853–56. Each of the battles of this war opened a new page in world military history - the Battle of Sinop was no exception. Here are some facts about this naval battle.
The last battle of the sailing fleets
The battle that took place on November 30, 1853 near the city of Sinop on the Black Sea coast of Turkey between the Turkish and Russian squadrons is considered the last battle of the era of sailing fleets and the first with the use of bomb guns that fired explosive shells.
Turkish forces
The forces of the Turkish squadron, which arrived in Sinop from Istanbul and was preparing to land a large amphibious assault in the area of Sukhum-Kale (modern name - Sukhum) and Poti, consisted of two steam frigates, seven sailing frigates, three corvettes and four transports.
Ship type |
Name |
Number of guns |
---|---|---|
Sailing frigate |
"Nizamiye" |
|
Sailing frigate |
"Nesimi Zefer" |
|
Sailing frigate |
"Forever Bahri" |
|
Sailing frigate |
"Damiad" |
|
Sailing frigate |
"Kaidi Zefer" |
|
Sailing frigate |
"Aunni Allah" |
|
Sailing frigate |
"Fazli Allah" |
|
"Nezhm Fishan" |
||
"Faze Meabud" |
||
"Guli Sefid" |
||
Steam frigate |
||
Steam frigate |
"Erkile" |
|
Total |
A.P. Bogolyubov, “The extermination of the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Sinop. 1854." Unfortunately, the only available images of Turkish ships are paintings by Russian artists
The flagship of the Turkish squadron was the frigate "Aunni Allah". According to Russian-language sources, the command of the Turkish ships was carried out by Osman Pasha, in turn, English-language sources (in particular, the book by R. Ernest Dupuis and Trevor N. Dupuis “The World History of Wars”) name Huseyn Pasha as the commander. Perhaps Huseyn Pasha took command of the squadron already during the battle, after Osman Pasha was wounded.
Turkish admiral Osman Pasha. The portrait is shown in the book “The Russo-Turkish War” by H. M. Hozier, undated
The Turkish coastal defense consisted of six artillery batteries (one eight-gun, three six-gun and two batteries of unknown composition), armed with 38 guns.
Russian forces
The Russian squadron consisted of six battleships, two sailing frigates and three steam frigates.
I.K. Aivazovsky, “Review of the Black Sea Fleet in 1849.” The second in the column is the battleship Rostislav, which took part in the Battle of Sinop
Ship type |
Name |
Number of guns |
---|---|---|
Battleship |
||
Battleship |
"Grand Duke Constantine" |
|
Battleship |
"Three Saints" |
|
Battleship |
"Empress Maria" |
|
Battleship |
||
Battleship |
"Rostislav" |
|
"Kulevchi" |
||
Steam frigate |
"Odessa" |
|
Steam frigate |
||
Steam frigate |
"Chersonese" |
|
Total |
The Russian squadron was commanded by Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov, and the flagship ship was the battleship Empress Maria.
Osman Pasha's dilemma
The Battle of Sinop had a kind of prelude. Approaching Sinop on November 23 and discovering a detachment of Turkish ships in the bay, Admiral Nakhimov decided to block the port with three battleships (Empress Maria, Chesma and Rostislav) until reinforcements arrived from Sevastopol. A significant part of historians condemn the Turkish admiral for the fact that, having a significant advantage in artillery (472 guns versus 252), he did not attack Russian ships. However, the authors of textbooks on naval tactics are more loyal to Osman Pasha. In their opinion, Admiral Nakhimov, having blocked the port, left his Turkish “colleague” two options for the development of events: either, taking a landing party on board, break through to Sukhum-Kala and Poti, or try to destroy the Russian ships and then take on board the landing party. The first option could lead to significant casualties among the landing party, and in the second case, the Russian ships could retreat without taking the fight, and, waiting for the Turkish ships to return to the port, resume the blockade. Therefore, many experts in naval tactics consider the decision of the Turkish admiral to wait for reinforcements to be absolutely justified.
Wake columns are the key to a successful attack
After the arrival of reinforcements, Admiral Nakhimov decided to attack the Turkish squadron. Since he saw the main threat to his ships in Turkish coastal guns, capable of using hot cannonballs in battle, a tactic was chosen designed to minimize the time of the battle. To reduce the time required to reach firing positions, Russian ships had to move in two wake columns (the right column (consisting of the battleships Empress Maria, Chesma and Rostislav) was led by Nakhimov himself, the left column (consisting of the battleships Paris, Velikiy Prince Konstantin" and "Three Saints") - Rear Admiral F. M. Novosilsky). To reduce the time of fire contact, the opening of fire was planned from a distance of 1.5–2 cables (about 270–370 meters).
I.K. Aivazovsky, “120-gun ship “Paris””. "Paris" and the battleships of the same type "Grand Duke Konstantin" and "Three Saints", sheathed below the waterline with steel sheets and armed with bomb guns, constituted the main combat force of the Russian squadron
Destroying an entire squadron in just 3.5 hours
The battle began at 9:30 a.m. with the raising of the signal “Prepare for battle and go to the Sinop roadstead” on the battleship “Empress Maria.” The active part of the battle began at 12 hours 28 minutes, when the Turkish flagship Auni Allah fired the first salvo at the Russian ships. The battle lasted up to 16 hours and ended with the complete defeat of the Turkish squadron. As a result of the battle, the frigate "Navek Bahri", two corvettes ("Nezhm Fishan" and "Gyuli Sefid") and the steam frigate "Erkile" were destroyed, and six frigates ("Aunni Allah", "Fazli Allah", "Nizamiye", "Nesimi" Zefer", "Damiad" and "Kaidi Zefer") and the corvette "Feize Meabud" - washed ashore. The total losses of the Turks amounted to up to 3,000 people killed and wounded, as well as 200 people captured, including Admiral Osman Pasha.
Dismissal is a “reward” for saving the ship
The only surviving Turkish ship is the steam frigate "Taif" under the command of Captain Adolph Slade (sometimes another spelling is found - Slad) - an Englishman who converted to Islam (Russian-language sources do not have a clear opinion about the Muslim name of the captain, calling him "Yahya Bey" or "Mushaver" -pasha").
The story of the ship breaking through from Sinop is no less controversial. Contrary to popular belief, the Taif did not leave Sinop Bay immediately after the start of the battle, but only made a breakthrough at about 13:00 (according to another version - 14:00). It is known for sure that the ship took part in the battle - among the crew there were 11 killed and 17 wounded. According to the most common version, upon returning to Istanbul, Captain Adolph Slade was dismissed from service and stripped of his rank for “inappropriate behavior.” According to legend, Sultan Abdulmecid was very dissatisfied with the flight of Taif, saying: “I would prefer that he did not flee, but died in battle, like the rest.”.
Adolph Slade. Image first appeared in Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900, undated
The Battle of Sinop, which took place on November 30, 1853, was preceded by many events. At the beginning of the year, the “Eastern Question” escalated; the Black Sea Fleet deprived the Caucasian highlanders of an important source of income, but it made a mistake in its strategic calculations and almost missed Turkish ships at Sinop, an important transshipment base through which the Caucasian “revolutionaries” were supplied. Having obtained permission to attack the enemy, Admiral Nakhimov did not shelve the matter.
Admiral Nakhimov's plan
On November 16, the Russian steamer Bessarabia captured the Turkish steamer Medzhir Tadzhiret. The prisoners showed that a Turkish squadron was stationed in Sinop: three frigates, two corvettes and cargo transports - all sailing. Scouts were immediately sent to the port, who discovered seven frigates, two corvettes (in fact there were three) and two paddle steamers.
Due to the storm, Nakhimov approached Sinop only on November 23. The next day he received permission to attack the Turkish squadron in Sinop. But only a squadron. It was ordered to refrain from firing in the city (Menshikov’s order clearly states: "spare Sinop") and open fire only if the Turks start shooting first.
Sinop Bay today
At that time, Nakhimov had only three battleships, so the Russians refrained from attacking, organizing a blockade of Sinop and waiting for the squadron of Rear Admiral Fyodor Novosilsky to help: three battleships and two frigates. Novosilsky joined Nakhimov only on November 28. According to the plan, the Russian squadron in the formation of two wake columns (the ships followed one after another along the course line) was supposed to break through to the Sinop roadstead and deliver a fire strike on the enemy ships and batteries. The first column was to be commanded by Nakhimov. It included the ships “Empress Maria” (flagship), “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Chesma”. The second column - "Paris" (the second flagship), "Three Saints" and "Rostislav" - was to be led by Novosilsky. Next, the ships anchored in front of the line of Ottoman frigates and fired at them until they were completely destroyed. Concluding his instructions, the Vice Admiral ordered, “having started dealings with enemy ships, try, if possible, not to harm the consular houses on which their national flags will be raised”. He also emphasized that “All preliminary instructions under changed circumstances can make it difficult for a commander who knows his business, and therefore I leave everyone completely independently to act at their own discretion, but will certainly fulfill their duty.”
On November 30, 1853, the composition of the Russian squadron under the command of Admiral Nakhimov was as follows:
Name |
Ship type |
Cannons |
Grand Duke Constantine |
Battleship |
|
Three Saints |
Battleship |
|
Paris |
Battleship |
|
Empress Maria |
Battleship |
|
Chesma |
Battleship |
|
Rostislav |
Battleship |
|
Kulevchi |
||
Cahul |
||
A separate division of steam frigates under the command of Admiral Kornilov |
||
Odessa |
steam frigate |
|
Crimea |
steam frigate |
|
Chersonesos |
steam frigate |
Battle of Sinop
At 6 a.m. on November 30, 1853, a signal was raised on Nakhimov’s flagship, the 84-gun ship Empress Maria. "Prepare for battle!". On a gloomy rainy morning with a squally wind, Russian ships moved in two columns towards Sinop Bay. The time was not chosen by chance: Muslims were performing namaz at that moment. The Russians are truly lucky. Either because of prayer, or simply because the Turkish coastal batteries did not expect that the Russians would launch an attack, Nakhimov passed through the dangerous approach zone without opposition from the shore. In the log book of the ship “Three Saints” it is noted:
“Passing (...) the batteries, designated by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, not the slightest movement was visible on them, but the Turks fleeing from the village of Ada-Kioi were probably in a hurry to take their places: however, our squadron managed to pass by the batteries ».
Those batteries that did engage in battle with Russian ships were armed with old 14- and 19-pound guns, the effectiveness of which was close to zero. In addition, they were protected by earthen parapets and they were served not by the army, but by the local police. The poor condition of the batteries had been repeatedly reported to Istanbul before.
Plan of the Battle of Sinop
But even without the opposition of the batteries, problems occurred due to the weather and inconvenient wind. In particular, the left Russian column anchored further from the enemy than planned, which allowed the Turkish steam frigate Taif to escape. "Empress Maria", the flagship of Nakhimov himself, did not reach the center of the bay, which is why "Chesma", the end of the right column, could not act against Turkish ships, and the battle for her was reduced to a fight with batteries No. 3 and No. 4. In addition, "Chesma" and "Grand Duke Konstantin" interfered with each other, blocking the sectors of fire, so that they had to change anchorage under Turkish fire. At the beginning of the battle, the “Three Saints” had its spring broken, the ship was turned around, and in the heat of battle the gunners of the 120-gunner continued to fire, but on their own. Several cannonballs hit “Paris” and “Rostislav” until Novosilsky raised the signal to the “Three Saints” to cease fire.
At 12:30 the Russians closed in and the battle began. Coastal batteries No. 4, 5 and 6 also came into action. At 12:45 the strongest Turkish frigate Taif separated the couples. It is still unclear whether it passed between the warring parties or between the Turkish ships and the shore, but then the Taif passed battery No. 6, slipped between the frigates Kulevchi and Kagul and, giving full speed, set course at 12:57 to Istanbul. Later, its captain Yahya Bey, who was expecting a reward for saving the ship, was put on trial and dismissed from service for misbehavior. Sultan Abdulmecid expressed his dissatisfaction: “I would prefer that he did not flee, but died in battle, like the rest.”
13:00. The 84-gun Empress Maria, which stood on the spring opposite the Turkish Avnullah, simply tore the frigate to pieces with full broadsides, and the Turkish flagship jumped ashore. Nakhimov transferred the fire to Fazlullah. He followed the example of the flagship. "Grand Duke Konstantin" entered into battle with two frigates at once - "Nâvek-i Bahrî" and "Nesîm-i Zafer". The first one, which also came under fire from the approaching Chesma, exploded after 15 minutes of battle. The second, engulfed in flames, was carried to the pier near battery No. 5. The corvette “Necm-Efşân” was also completely destroyed.
Battle of Sinop. Artist A.P. Bogolyubov
13:05. The 120-gun Paris fired several salvos at Battery No. 5, formally carrying out the order “respond only to shelling from the shore”, and then transferred fire to the frigate “Dimyad” and the corvette “Gül-i Sefîd”. The corvette exploded almost immediately, and the frigate was knocked off its spring and drifted to the shore. Paris, by the way, spent more 68-pound bombs than any other Russian ship - 70 out of 893 stored. “Empress Maria” spent five out of 176, “Grand Duke Constantine” - 30 out of 457, “Three Saints” - 28 out of 147, and finally, “Rostislav” - 16 out of 400. In total, the Black Sea Fleet spent 167 bombs during the battle.
13:30–14:00. “Three Saints” began the battle with “Kaaid-i Zafer”, “Nizamiye” and battery No. 6. A stray cannonball from the battery broke the ship’s spring, turned its stern towards the battery, and the 120-gunner survived several unpleasant minutes, also firing several salvos on their own. Within 15 minutes, a new verp was launched under fire, the ship turned around and unleashed powerful salvos on its opponents. The first frigate ran ashore and exploded at 14:00.
By 16:00, not only the Turkish squadron was burning - the whole city was already on fire. The fire from the batteries spread to residential buildings. The Russians several times sent parliamentarians to the walls of the fortress, conveying the words of the commanders: “Stop shooting from the city, the Russians will not shoot back along the shore" However, it was simply impossible to hear them.
The main loss of the Turks was not even warships, but transport ships, which carried out transfers to the Caucasian coast. Nakhimov’s words spoken to Prefect Sinop sounded like subtle mockery:
“I leave this port and address you as a representative of a friendly nation, counting on your services to explain to the city authorities that the imperial squadron had no hostile intention either against the city or against the port of Sinop.”.
Admiral Nakhimov on the quarterdeck of the Empress Maria during the battle
After the battle, Nakhimov wrote to the Tsar:
« The command of Your Imperial Majesty was carried out by the Black Sea Fleet in the most brilliant manner. The first Turkish squadron that decided to go into battle, On the 18th (30th) of November it was exterminated by Vice Admiral Nakhimov. The Turkish admiral Osman Pasha, who commanded it, was wounded, captured and brought to Sevastopol. The enemy was in the Sinop roadstead, where, reinforced by coastal batteries, he took the battle. At the same time, seven frigates, a sloop, two corvettes, one steamship and several transports were destroyed. Therefore, there was only one steamer left, which escaped due to its excellent speed. This squadron, apparently, is the same one that was equipped to capture Sukhum and assist the highlanders».
Consequences
Foreign diplomats in Istanbul reacted differently to the battle: “The British melancholy pondered the results of Sinop”, while the French "indulged in rejoicing". At the suggestion of the English ambassador to Turkey, Stratford de Redcliffe, the Porte banned it altogether. “conversations on political topics, including Sinop, in bazaars, coffee shops, teahouses, etc.” to whom the Turks "indulged with rapture".
An unprecedented wind that began in the Bosporus area caused additional damage to the Turks: from November 30 to December 2, 1853, it simply threw ships ashore. Actually, in this situation, the Ottomans almost accepted the Russian conditions. Had our ships appeared after Sinop in front of the Bosporus, history would have taken a different path. This was the main mistake of Nicholas I after Sinop. On December 3, 1853, shortly after the battle, he wrote to Menshikov:
“I think that the great actions of the fleet are over and rest. It seems that 4 frigates and ordinary steamers must be enough for us now, when the main enemy squadron no longer exists. If for sure the British and French enter the Black Sea, we will not fight with them, but let them taste our batteries in Sevastopol, where you will receive them with a salute. I am not afraid of a landing, and if there was an attempt, it seems that even now it is possible to repel them. In April we will have the entire 16th division with its artillery, a brigade of hussars and horse batteries, more than necessary to make them pay well.”
Actually, the further course of events was decided in three or four days after Sinop. If the Russians had sent their ships to the Bosphorus then, there would have been no Crimean War. The Turkish government was ready to sign any agreements. In addition, Turkey, however, as always, had no money at all for the war. They wanted to borrow 30,000,000 kurus from Austria, but this was not allowed to happen by the British, who offered their loan, not in money, but in goods, weapons and advisers. The Sultan wanted exactly money - these silver and gold circles, because the same soldiers of the Istanbul garrison perceived paper money in Turkey very nervously, and it was impossible to anger them.
Immediately after the news of the defeat, the Sultan issued a firman about the unhindered passage of Russian merchant (and not so) ships through the straits without inspection until February 23, 1854 inclusive. The most important result was the burning of the squadron and Sinop, which dealt a terrible moral blow to the mountaineers in the Caucasus. The people there always respected only strength, and strength was demonstrated very visibly. Now there is a solid basis for negotiations and confidence that the elders of local teips will at least listen to the Russians.
Glow of Sinop. Artist I. Aivazovsky
The British reaction to what happened is well reflected in the words printed in the Illustrated Landon News on December 2, 1853: "A minor victory that doesn't live up to the loud cackling about it". The same newspaper wrote that Emperor Nicholas really deserved at least one resounding victory in the war, which clearly began unsuccessfully for him. Some publications stated that "the battle was unfair", after all “Nicholas took advantage of the helplessness of the Turkish fleet”. The Naval Chronicle reported that there would have been no Sinop if there had been an English fleet in the Black Sea.
But the other side of the Sinop battle, which we often simply do not know about, turned out to be really important. The opposition announced that Prime Minister Aberdeen had secret agreements with Nicholas and, in general, he was one of the culprits in the Sinop battle. The press, in fact, accused the Prime Minister of England of being a bit of a spy for Russia. Moreover, even Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the husband of Queen Victoria, is also a spy of the Russian emperor. We even agreed that “the prince, being a German, is not able to relate to events in the world from the point of view of English liberalism”.
On December 5, 1853, the French ambassador, on behalf of England, Austria and Prussia, addressed the Sultan with the question of what he saw as a way out of the current situation. According to the ambassador, England, France, Austria and Prussia were supposed to become mediators between Turkey and Russia. But then news of Sinope came to France. It seemed that Nikolai had outwitted everyone and would now make peace without intermediaries. It turned out that France was left with nothing. Moreover, in the thoughts of Napoleon III, Russian squadrons were already heading to the Bosporus, and Russian troops were landing in Istanbul.
On December 17, 1853, the English ambassador to the French court had a conversation with Napoleon III, after which he immediately informed the Foreign Minister: “ The French government believes that the Sinop affair, and not the crossing of the Danube, should be a signal for the action of the fleets" Before the minister had time to come to his senses, the ambassador informed him that the French emperor had called him again and directly stated that it was necessary “ sweep the Russian flag away from the sea", and that he, the Emperor, would be disappointed if this plan was not accepted by England. Moreover, Napoleon III ordered his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Walewski, to inform London that if England even refuses to send its fleet into the Black Sea, the French will enter there themselves and will act as they see fit.
Naturally, it was a bluff. But this bluff worked. Napoleon lived in England for a long time and knew the psychology of the British: they wanted to participate in any division of any territories and were greatly shuddered at actions at sea without their participation. The coalition against Russia began to rapidly take shape. Actually, it was Sinop who forced the British and French to forget their eternal enmity and unite against Russia. Of course, this was not the only factor in the formation of the anti-Russian coalition, but it gave the politicians from the “war party” an excellent trump card, which they could now use to strengthen the confrontation with Russia, simultaneously resolving their local political interests in the struggle for power.
“By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you adorned the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in the sea.”
Emperor Nicholas I
“The destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet.”
P. S. Nakhimov
December 1 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia. This is the day of the victory of the Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov over the Turkish squadron at Cape Sinop.
The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop on the Black Sea coast of Turkey on November 18 (30), 1853. The Turkish squadron was defeated within a few hours. The Battle of Cape Sinop was one of the major battles of the Crimean (Eastern) War, which began as a conflict between Russia and Turkey. Moreover, it went down in history as the last major battle of sailing fleets. Russia gained a serious advantage over the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire and dominance in the Black Sea (before the intervention of the great Western powers).
This naval battle became an example of the brilliant preparation of the Black Sea Fleet, led by one of the best representatives of the school of Russian military art. Sinop amazed all of Europe with the perfection of the Russian fleet and fully justified the many years of hard educational work of admirals Lazarev and Nakhimov.
A. P. Bogolyubov. Destruction of the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Sinop
Background
In 1853, another war between Russia and Turkey began. It led to a global conflict involving the world's leading powers. The Anglo-French squadron entered the Dardanelles. Fronts were opened on the Danube and in Transcaucasia. St. Petersburg, which was counting on a quick victory over the Porte, a decisive advancement of Russian interests in the Balkans and a successful solution to the problem of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, received the threat of war with the great powers, with vague prospects. There was a threat that the Ottomans, followed by the British and French, would be able to provide effective assistance to the Shamil mountaineers. This led to a new large-scale war in the Caucasus and a serious threat to Russia from the south.
In the Caucasus, Russia did not have enough troops to simultaneously hold back the advance of the Turkish army and fight the mountaineers. In addition, the Turkish squadron supplied the troops on the Caucasian coast with ammunition. Therefore, the Black Sea Fleet received two main tasks: 1) quickly transport reinforcements from Crimea to the Caucasus; 2) strike at the enemy’s sea communications. Prevent the Ottomans from landing a large landing force on the eastern coast of the Black Sea in the Sukhum-Kale (Sukhumi) and Poti area to help the highlanders. Pavel Stepanovich completed both tasks.
On September 13, an emergency order was received in Sevastopol to transfer an infantry division with artillery to Anakria (Anaklia). The Black Sea Fleet was in turmoil at that time. There were rumors about an Anglo-French squadron acting on the side of the Ottomans. Nakhimov immediately took over the operation. In four days, he prepared the ships and placed troops on them in perfect order: 16 battalions with two batteries (more than 16 thousand people), and all the necessary weapons and equipment. On September 17, the squadron went to sea and on the morning of September 24 arrived in Anakria. By evening the unloading was completed. The operation was considered brilliant; there were only a few sick people among the sailors and soldiers.
Having solved the first problem, Pavel Stepanovich proceeded to the second. It was necessary to disrupt the enemy landing operation. A 20 thousand Turkish corps was concentrated in Batumi, which was supposed to be transported by a large transport flotilla (up to 250 ships). The landing was to be covered by Osman Pasha's squadron.
At this time, the commander of the Crimean Army and the Black Sea Fleet was Prince Alexander Menshikov. He sent a squadron of Nakhimov and Kornilov to search for the enemy. On November 5 (17), V. A. Kornilov met the Ottoman 10-gun steamer Pervaz-Bahre, coming from Sinop. The steam frigate "Vladimir" (11 guns) under the flag of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Kornilov attacked the enemy. The battle was directly led by the commander of the Vladimir, Lieutenant Commander Grigory Butakov. He used the high maneuverability of his ship and noticed the weakness of the enemy - the absence of guns at the stern of the Turkish steamer. Throughout the battle I tried to stay in such a way as not to fall under Ottoman fire. The three-hour battle ended in Russian victory. This was the first battle of steam ships in history. Then Vladimir Kornilov returned to Sevastopol and ordered Rear Admiral F. M. Novosilsky to find Nakhimov and reinforce him with the battleships Rostislav and Svyatoslav, and the brig Aeneas. Novosilsky met with Nakhimov and, having completed the assignment, returned to Sevastopol.
Nakhimov and his detachment had been cruising between Sukhum and part of the Anatolian coast since the end of October, where the main port was Sinop. The vice admiral, after meeting with Novosiltsev, had five 84-gun ships: Empress Maria, Chesma, Rostislav, Svyatoslav and Brave, as well as the frigate Kovarna and the brig Aeneas. On November 2 (14), Nakhimov issued an order for the squadron, where he notified the commanders that in the event of a meeting with an enemy “superior to us in strength, I will attack him, being completely confident that each of us will do his job.”
Every day we waited for the enemy to appear. In addition, there was the possibility of meeting with British ships. But there was no Ottoman squadron. We only met Novosilsky, who brought two ships, replacing those battered by the storm and sent to Sevastopol. On November 8, a severe storm broke out, and the vice admiral was forced to send 4 more ships for repairs. The situation was critical. Strong winds continued after the storm on November 8th.
On November 11, Nakhimov approached Sinop and immediately sent a brig with the news that an Ottoman squadron was stationed in the bay. Despite significant enemy forces standing under the protection of 6 coastal batteries, Nakhimov decided to block Sinop Bay and wait for reinforcements. He asked Menshikov to send the ships “Svyatoslav” and “Brave”, the frigate “Kovarna” and the steamer “Bessarabia” sent for repairs. The admiral also expressed bewilderment why he was not sent the frigate "Kulevchi", which is idle in Sevastopol, and sent two more additional ships necessary for cruising. Nakhimov was ready to fight if the Turks made a breakthrough. However, the Turkish command, although at that time had an advantage in strength, did not dare to engage in a general battle or simply make a breakthrough. When Nakhimov reported that the Ottoman forces in Sinop, according to his observations, were higher than previously thought, Menshikov sent reinforcements - Novosilsky's squadron, and then a detachment of Kornilov's steamers.
The battle of the frigate Vladimir with the Turkish-Egyptian military steamer Pervaz-Bahri on November 5, 1853. A. P. Bogolyubov
Strengths of the parties
Reinforcements arrived on time. On November 16 (28), 1853, Nakhimov’s detachment was reinforced by the squadron of Rear Admiral Fyodor Novosilsky: 120-gun battleships “Paris”, “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Three Saints”, frigates “Kahul” and “Kulevchi”. As a result, under the command of Nakhimov there were already 6 battleships: the 84-gun “Empress Maria”, “Chesma” and “Rostislav”, the 120-gun “Paris”, “Grand Duke Constantine” and “Three Saints”, the 60-gun frigate “ Kulevchi" and the 44-gun "Kahul". Nakhimov had 716 guns; from each side the squadron could fire a salvo weighing 378 pounds 13 pounds. 76 guns were bomb guns, firing explosive bombs that had great destructive power. Thus, the Russian fleet had the advantage. In addition, Kornilov rushed to Nakhimov’s aid with three steam frigates.
The Turkish squadron included: 7 frigates, 3 corvettes, several auxiliary ships and a detachment of 3 steam frigates. In total, the Turks had 476 naval guns, supported by 44 coastal guns. The Ottoman squadron was led by the Turkish Vice Admiral Osman Pasha. The second flagship was Rear Admiral Hussein Pasha. There was an English adviser with the squadron - Captain A. Slade. The steamship detachment was commanded by Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha. The Turks had their advantages, the main ones being parking in a fortified base and the presence of steamships, while the Russians only had sailing ships.
Admiral Osman Pasha, knowing that the Russian squadron was guarding him at the exit from the bay, sent an alarming message to Istanbul, asking for help, significantly exaggerating Nakhimov’s forces. However, the Turks were late; the message was transmitted to the British on November 17 (29), a day before the attack of the Russian fleet. Even if Lord Stratford-Radcliffe, who at that time actually led the policy of the Porte, gave the order to the British squadron to go to the aid of Osman Pasha, help would still be late. Moreover, the British ambassador in Istanbul did not have the right to start a war with the Russian Empire; the admiral could refuse.
N. P. Medovikov. P. S. Nakhimov during the Battle of Sinop on November 18, 1853
Nakhimov's plan
The Russian admiral, as soon as reinforcements arrived, decided not to wait, to immediately enter Sinop Bay and attack the enemy. In essence, Nakhimov was taking a risk, albeit a well calculated one. The Ottomans had good naval and coastal guns, and with appropriate leadership, the Turkish forces could inflict serious damage on the Russian squadron. However, the once formidable Ottoman navy was in decline, both in terms of combat training and leadership.
The Turkish command itself played along with Nakhimov, positioning the ships extremely inconveniently for defense. Firstly, the Ottoman squadron was positioned like a fan, a concave arc. As a result, the ships blocked the firing sector of part of the coastal batteries. Secondly, the ships were located right next to the embankment, which did not give them the opportunity to maneuver and fire on both sides. Thus, the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries could not fully resist the Russian fleet.
Nakhimov's plan was imbued with determination and initiative. The Russian squadron, in the formation of two wake columns (the ships followed one after another along the course line), received the order to break through to the Sinop roadstead and deliver a fire strike on the enemy ships and batteries. The first column was commanded by Nakhimov. It included the ships “Empress Maria” (flagship), “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Chesma”. The second column was led by Novosilsky. It included “Paris” (2nd flagship), “Three Saints” and “Rostislav”. The movement in two columns was supposed to reduce the time it took for ships to pass under the fire of the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries. In addition, it was easier to deploy Russian ships into battle formation when anchored. In the rearguard were frigates, which were supposed to stop the enemy’s attempts to escape. The targets of all ships were distributed in advance.
At the same time, ship commanders had a certain independence in choosing targets, depending on the specific situation, while implementing the principle of mutual support. “In conclusion, I will express the idea,” Nakhimov wrote in the order, “that all preliminary instructions under changed circumstances can make it difficult for a commander who knows his business, and therefore I allow everyone to act completely independently at their own discretion, but will certainly fulfill their duty.”
Battle
At dawn on November 18 (30), Russian ships entered Sinop Bay. At the head of the right column was Pavel Nakhimov's flagship "Empress Maria", at the head of the left - "Paris" of Fyodor Novosilsky. The weather was unfavorable. At 12:30 p.m., the Ottoman flagship, the 44-gun Avni-Allah, opened fire, followed by guns from other ships and coastal batteries. The Turkish command hoped that strong barrage fire from naval and coastal batteries would not allow the Russian squadron to break through to close range and would force the Russians to retreat. Possibly will cause severe damage to some ships that can be captured. Nakhimov's ship went ahead and stood closest to the Ottoman ships. The admiral stood on the captain's cabin and watched the fierce artillery battle unfold.
The victory of the Russian fleet became apparent after just over two hours. Turkish artillery showered shells on the Russian squadron and was able to cause significant damage to some ships, but failed to sink a single one. The Russian admiral, knowing the techniques of the Ottoman commanders, foresaw that the main enemy fire would initially be concentrated on the mast (above-deck parts of the ship's equipment), and not on the decks. The Turks wanted to incapacitate as many Russian sailors as possible when they removed the sails before anchoring the ships, as well as disrupt the controllability of the ships and worsen their ability to maneuver. And so it happened, Turkish shells broke the yards, topmasts, and made holes in the sails. The Russian flagship took on a significant part of the enemy attack, most of its spar and standing rigging were broken, only one shroud of the mainmast remained intact. After the battle, 60 holes were counted in one side. However, the Russian sailors were below, Pavel Stepanovich ordered the ships to be anchored without removing the sails. All Nakhimov’s orders were carried out exactly. The frigate "Avni-Allah" ("Aunni-Allah") could not withstand the confrontation with the Russian flagship and washed ashore after half an hour. The Turkish squadron lost its control center. Then the Empress Maria bombarded the 44-gun frigate Fazli-Allah with shells, which also could not withstand the duel and ran ashore. The admiral transferred the fire of the battleship to battery No. 5.
I.K. Aivazovsky. "Sinop Battle"
The ship "Grand Duke Konstantin" fired at the 60-gun frigates "Navek-Bakhri" and "Nesimi-Zefer", the 24-gun corvette "Nedjmi Fishan", and at battery No. 4. “Navek-Bakhri” took off within 20 minutes. One of the Russian shells hit the powder magazine. This explosion also disabled battery No. 4. Corpses and shipwrecks littered the battery. Later the battery resumed fire, but it was weaker than before. The second frigate, after its anchor chain was broken, washed ashore. The Turkish corvette could not stand the duel and ran ashore. “Grand Duke Constantine” received 30 holes and damage to all masts in the Battle of Sinop.
The battleship "Chesma", under the command of Viktor Mikryukov, fired at batteries No. 4 and No. 3. Russian sailors strictly followed Nakhimov’s instructions on mutual support. The ship "Konstantin" was forced to fight three enemy ships and a Turkish battery at once. Therefore, the Chesma stopped firing at the batteries and concentrated all its fire on the Turkish frigate Navek-Bahri. The Turkish ship, hit by fire from two Russian ships, took off into the air. Then "Chesma" suppressed the enemy batteries. The ship received 20 holes, damage to the mainmast and bowsprit.
In a similar situation, when the principle of mutual support was fulfilled, half an hour later the ship “Three Saints” found itself. The battleship under the command of K. S. Kutrov fought with the 54-gun frigate "Kaidi-Zefer" and the 62-gun "Nizamiye". Enemy shots broke the spring of the Russian ship (the cable to the anchor holding the ship in a given position), and the “Three Saints” began to turn into the wind with its stern towards the enemy. The ship was subjected to longitudinal fire from battery No. 6, and its mast was seriously damaged. Immediately, “Rostislav”, under the command of Captain 1st Rank A.D. Kuznetsov, who himself was under heavy fire, stopped returning fire and focused all his attention on battery No. 6. As a result, the Turkish battery was razed to the ground. The Rostislav also forced the 24-gun corvette Feyze-Meabud to beach itself. When midshipman Varnitsky was able to repair the damage on the Svyatitel, the ship began to successfully fire at the Kaidi-Zefer and other ships, forcing them to run ashore. "Three Saints" received 48 holes, as well as damage to the stern, all masts and bowsprit. The help did not come cheap for the Rostislav either; the ship almost blew up, a fire started on it, the fire approached the cruise chamber, but the fire was extinguished. "Rostislav" received 25 holes, as well as damage to all masts and bowsprit. More than 100 people from his team were wounded.
The second Russian flagship "Paris" fought an artillery duel with the 56-gun frigate "Damiad", the 22-gun corvette "Gyuli Sefid" and the central coastal battery No. 5. The corvette caught fire and took off. The battleship concentrated its fire on the frigate. The Damiad could not withstand the heavy fire, the Turkish crew cut off the anchor rope, and the frigate was thrown ashore. Then the Paris attacked the 62-gun Nizamiye, on which Admiral Hussein Pasha was holding the flag. The Ottoman ship lost two masts - the fore and mizzen masts, and a fire started on it. The Nizamiye washed ashore. The commander of the ship, Vladimir Istomin, showed “fearlessness and fortitude” in this battle and made “prudent, skillful and quick orders.” After the defeat of Nizamiye, Paris concentrated on the central coastal battery, which provided great opposition to the Russian squadron. The Turkish battery was suppressed. The battleship received 16 holes, as well as damage to the stern and gondeck.
A. V. Ganzen “Battleship “Empress Maria” under sail”
I. K. Aivazovsky “120-gun ship “Paris””
Thus, by 17:00, Russian sailors destroyed 15 out of 16 enemy ships with artillery fire and suppressed all of their coastal batteries. Random cannonballs also set fire to city buildings located in close proximity to the coastal batteries, which led to the spread of fire and caused panic among the population.
Of the entire Turkish squadron, only one high-speed 20-gun steamer Taif managed to escape, on board of which was the chief adviser to the Turks on maritime issues, the Englishman Slade, who, having arrived in Istanbul, reported on the destruction of Turkish ships in Sinop.
It is worth noting that the presence of two steam frigates in the Turkish squadron seriously puzzled the Russian admiral. Admiral Nakhimov did not have steamers at the beginning of the battle; they arrived only at the very end of the battle. A fast enemy ship, under the command of a British captain, could perform well in a battle when Russian ships were engaged in battle and their sails were damaged. Sailing ships could not maneuver easily and quickly in these conditions. Nakhimov took this threat into account so much that he dedicated an entire paragraph of his disposition to it (No. 9). Two frigates were left in reserve and were given the task of neutralizing the actions of enemy steam frigates.
However, this reasonable precaution was not justified. The Russian admiral assessed the possible actions of the enemy on his own. He was ready to fight even in conditions of complete enemy superiority; enemy commanders thought differently. Taif's captain Slade was an experienced commander, but he was not going to fight to the last drop of blood. Seeing that the Turkish squadron was in danger of destruction, the British captain skillfully maneuvered between the Rostislav and battery No. 6, and fled towards Constantinople. The frigates "Kulevchi" and "Kahul" tried to intercept the enemy, but they were unable to keep up with the fast steamer. Breaking away from the Russian frigates, the Taif almost fell into the hands of Kornilov. A detachment of Kornilov's steam frigates hurried to the aid of Nakhimov's squadron and collided with the Taif. However, Slade was able to escape from Kornilov's steamships.
Towards the end of the battle, a detachment of ships approached Sinop under the command of Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov, who was rushing to the aid of Nakhimov from Sevastopol. A participant in these events, B.I. Baryatinsky, who was in Kornilov’s squadron, wrote: “Approaching the ship “Maria” (Nakhimov’s flagship), we board the boat of our steamer and go to the ship, which is all pierced by cannonballs, almost all the shrouds are broken, and when Quite a strong swell caused the masts to sway so much that they threatened to fall. We board the ship, and both admirals rush into each other’s arms, we all also congratulate Nakhimov. He was magnificent, his cap on the back of his head, his face stained with blood, new epaulettes, his nose - everything was red with blood, sailors and officers... all black with gunpowder smoke... It turned out that on the "Maria" there were the most killed and wounded, as Nakhimov was walking the lead in the squadron and from the very beginning of the battle became closest to the Turkish firing sides. Nakhimov’s coat, which he took off before the battle and immediately hung on a nail, was torn by a Turkish cannonball.”
I.K. Aivazovsky. “Sinop. The night after the battle on November 18, 1853"
Results
The Ottoman squadron was almost completely destroyed. During the three-hour battle, the Turks were defeated, their resistance was broken. A little later, they suppressed the remaining coastal fortifications and batteries and finished off the remnants of the squadron. One after another, Turkish ships took off. Russian bombs fell into powder magazines, or fire reached them; often the Turks themselves set fire to the ships, leaving them. Three frigates and one corvette were set on fire by the Turks themselves. “The battle is glorious, higher than Chesma and Navarino!” - this is how Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov assessed the battle.
The Turks lost about 3 thousand people, the British reported 4 thousand. Just before the battle, the Ottomans prepared for boardings and put additional soldiers on the ships. Explosions at batteries, fires and explosions of beached ships led to a strong fire in the city. Sinop suffered greatly. The population, authorities and garrison of Sinop fled to the mountains. The British later accused the Russians of deliberate cruelty towards the townspeople. 200 people were captured by the Russians. Among the prisoners was the commander of the Turkish squadron, Vice Admiral Osman Pasha (his leg was broken in the battle) and two ship commanders.
Russian ships fired about 17 thousand shells in four hours. The Battle of Sinop showed the importance of bombing guns for the future development of the fleet. Wooden ships could not withstand the fire of such cannons. It was necessary to develop armor protection for ships. The Rostislav gunners showed the highest rate of fire. 75-100 rounds were fired from each gun on the operational side of the battleship. On other ships of the squadron, 30-70 shots were fired from each gun on the active side. Russian commanders and sailors, according to Nakhimov, showed “truly Russian courage.” The advanced system of educating the Russian sailor, developed and implemented by Lazarev and Nakhimov, proved its superiority in battle. Hard training and sea voyages led to the fact that the Black Sea Fleet passed the Sinop exam with excellent marks.
Some Russian ships received significant damage, they were then towed by steamers, but all remained afloat. Russian losses amounted to 37 killed and 233 wounded. Everyone noted the highest skill of the Russian admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov, he correctly took into account his own strengths and the enemy’s forces, took reasonable risks, leading the squadron under fire from coastal batteries and the Omani squadron, worked out the battle plan in detail, and showed determination in achieving the goal. The absence of dead ships and relatively low losses in manpower confirm the reasonableness of Nakhimov’s decisions and naval leadership. Nakhimov himself was, as always, modest and said that all the credit belongs to Mikhail Lazarev. The Sinop battle became a brilliant point in the long history of the development of the sailing fleet. It should be noted that Lazarev, Nakhimov and Kornilov understood this very well, being supporters of the rapid development of the steam fleet.
At the end of the battle, the ships carried out the necessary repairs and weighed anchor on November 20 (December 2), moving to Sevastopol. On the 22nd (December 4), the Russian fleet entered the Sevastopol roadstead with general jubilation. The entire population of Sevastopol greeted the victorious squadron. It was a great day. Endless “Hurray, Nakhimov!” rushed from all sides. News of the crushing victory of the Black Sea Fleet rushed to the Caucasus, the Danube, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Emperor Nicholas awarded Nakhimov the Order of St. George, 2nd degree.
Pavel Stepanovich himself was concerned. The Russian admiral was pleased with the purely military results of the Battle of Sinop. The Black Sea Fleet brilliantly solved the main problem: it eliminated the possibility of a Turkish landing on the Caucasian coast and destroyed the Ottoman squadron, gaining complete dominance in the Black Sea. The colossal success was achieved with little blood and material losses. After a difficult search, battle and passage across the sea, all ships successfully returned to Sevastopol. Nakhimov was pleased with the sailors and commanders; they behaved superbly in the hot battle. However, Nakhimov had strategic thinking and understood that the main battles were still ahead. The Sinop victory will cause the appearance of Anglo-French forces in the Black Sea, which will use every effort to destroy the combat-ready Black Sea Fleet. The real war was just beginning.
The Battle of Sinop caused panic in Constantinople, where they were afraid of the appearance of the Russian fleet near the Ottoman capital. In Paris and London, at first they tried to belittle and belittle the significance of the feat of the Nakhimov squadron, and then, when this became useless, as the details of the Battle of Sinop appeared, envy and hatred arose. As Count Alexei Orlov wrote, “we are not forgiven for either skillful orders or the courage to carry them out.” A wave of Russophobia is rising in Western Europe. Westerners did not expect such brilliant actions on the part of the Russian naval forces. England and France are beginning to take retaliatory steps. The English and French squadrons, which were already stationed in the Bosphorus, on December 3 sent 2 ships to Sinop and 2 to Varna for reconnaissance. Paris and London immediately gave Turkey credit for the war. The Turks had been asking for money for a long time without success. Sinop changed everything. France and England were preparing to go to war, and the Battle of Sinop could force Constantinople to agree to a truce; the Ottomans suffered defeats on land and sea. It was necessary to encourage an ally. The largest bank in Paris immediately set about organizing the matter. The Ottoman Empire was given a loan of 2 million pounds sterling in gold. Moreover, half of the subscription for this amount was supposed to be covered by Paris, and the other by London. On the night of December 21-22, 1853 (January 3-4, 1854), the English and French squadrons, together with a division of the Ottoman fleet, entered the Black Sea.
During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The Soviet government established an order and medal in honor of Nakhimov. The Order was received by officers of the Navy for outstanding success in the development, conduct and support of naval operations, as a result of which an offensive operation of the enemy was repelled or active operations of the fleet were ensured, significant damage was inflicted on the enemy and their forces were preserved. The medal was awarded to sailors and foremen for military merits.
Day of Military Glory of Russia - Victory Day of the Russian squadron under the command of P.S. Nakhimov over the Turkish squadron at Cape Sinop (1853) - celebrated in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 “On the days of military glory (victory days) of Russia.”
150 years ago, at the very beginning of the Crimean War, the attention of the whole world was attracted by the glorious feat of Russian sailors, which became one of the brightest pages in the naval chronicle of Russia.
In October 1853, Turkey, incited by England and France, opened military operations in the Caucasus and the Danube. Thus began the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
In November 1853, a Turkish squadron under the command of Osman Pasha left Istanbul and embarked on a raid in the Black Sea port of Sinop. She had to cover the movement of 250 ships with troops assembled in Batum for landing in the area of Sukhum-Kale (Sukhumi) and Poti. The squadron consisted of 7 high-speed frigates, 3 corvettes, 2 steam frigates, 2 brigs and 2 military transports, which carried a total of 510 guns. The parking lot of Osman Pasha's ships in Sinop Bay was protected by coastal batteries (44 guns) equipped with earthen parapets. The cannons installed behind them could fire hot cannonballs, which were extremely dangerous for ships built entirely of wood. Easily breaking through the sides, they instantly caused a fire. It was very difficult to destroy coastal batteries with naval artillery fire; from the point of view of European maritime experts, it was almost impossible. Osman Pasha was assured of this by the chief English adviser Adolf Slade, who arrived at his squadron and received the rank of admiral and the title of Mushaver Pasha from the Sultan.
After the aggravation of relations with Turkey, but even before the outbreak of hostilities, a Russian squadron under the flag of Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov left Sevastopol to cruise in the eastern part of the Black Sea. The purpose of cruising, as stated in the instructions, was only to observe the Turkish fleet in anticipation of a break with Turkey. Nakhimov was strictly punished “without a special order - not to start a battle,” since at the time the Russian ships went to sea, the command of the Black Sea Fleet had not yet received news of the Turkish attack. The squadron that left Sevastopol included the battleships Empress Maria, Chesma, Brave, Yagudil, the frigate Cahul and the brig Jason. Two days later, the steamship Bessarabia joined the squadron. Russian ships arrived in the designated cruising area on October 13.
The campaign of Nakhimov’s squadron did not go unnoticed by the enemy. The sea was empty - all Turkish ships took refuge in their ports, navigation off the Anatolian coast temporarily stopped. Plans to transfer Ottoman troops by sea to the Caucasus were thwarted, but the Turkish command hoped to implement them later, after Nakhimov’s squadron had left for Sevastopol. At the same time, Istanbul was counting on the approaching time of autumn storms, which were extremely dangerous for sailing ships. But, contrary to the expectations of the enemy, the Russian squadron continued cruising. On October 26, a messenger ship (the corvette Calypso) that arrived at Nakhimov delivered the long-awaited permission from the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops and fleet in Crimea, Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov, to begin military operations against the enemy at sea. A few days later, the squadron commander received accurate information about the results of reconnaissance carried out by the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, near the Bosporus. At the same time, he was delivered the text of the manifesto of Emperor Nicholas I on the beginning of the war with Turkey. Turning to Nakhimov, Kornilov informed him of the enemy’s intention to send a flotilla to the Caucasus coast to land troops there. In this regard, on November 3, 1853, Nakhimov transmitted the following order to the ships of the squadron: “I have news that the Turkish fleet has gone to sea with the intention of occupying the port of Sukhum-Kale, which belongs to us, and that the adjutant general has been sent from Sevastopol with six ships to find the enemy fleet Kornilov. The enemy can only fulfill his intentions by passing us by or by giving us battle. In the first case, I hope for the vigilant supervision of the commanders and officers; in the second, with God's help and confidence in my officers and commands, I hope with honor accept the battle. Without expounding on instructions, I will express my idea that in naval affairs close distance from the enemy and mutual assistance to each other is the best tactic." Further, in another order of the same date, Nakhimov informed his subordinates: “Having received the order to begin military operations against Turkish military ships, I consider it necessary to notify the commanders of the ships of the detachment entrusted to me that in the event of meeting with an enemy exceeding us in strength, I will attack him, being absolutely sure that each of us will do his part."
On November 4, the steamship Bessarabia, sent by Nakhimov on reconnaissance to Cape Kerempe off the coast of Turkey, captured the enemy transport Medjari-Tejaret. From a survey of prisoners, previously received information was confirmed that the Turkish squadron of Osman Pasha was gathering in Sinop, intended to carry out a large landing operation off the Russian coast.
In addition to Nakhimov’s squadron, which blocked the coast of Eastern Anatolia, Kornilov’s squadron, cruising off the western coast of Turkey, went to sea. She failed to detect enemy warships, but from a survey of the crews of merchant ships it turned out that the Anglo-French squadron continued to stand in Bezik Bay (Beshik-Kerfez), in the Dardanelles Strait, and that on October 31, three large steamships with troops left Constantinople for Trebizond. Kornilov went to Sevastopol on the ship "Vladimir", ordering Rear Admiral Fyodor Mikhailovich Novosilsky to follow the squadron to Nakhimov and tell him this news. On the morning of November 6, Novosilsky reported to Nakhimov about the results of cruising in the western part of the Black Sea.
After this, Novosilsky's squadron, leaving Nakhimov with the battleships "Rostislav" and "Svyatoslav", the brig "Aeneas" and taking with it the battleship "Yagudiil" and the brig "Yazon" from Nakhimov's squadron, headed for Sevastopol. Vice Admiral Nakhimov, seeking a decisive meeting with the Turkish fleet, decided to check the information received. On November 6, despite the beginning of the excitement, his ships headed for Sinop Bay. On November 8, a strong storm began. However, the squadron did not lose its course, thanks to the skill of the flagship navigator I.M. Nekrasova. Nevertheless, after the end of the storm, the admiral was forced to send two ships to Sevastopol for corrections - “Brave” and “Svyatoslav”. On November 11, Nakhimov, with only three 84-gun ships ("Empress Maria", "Chesma" and "Rostislav"), approached two miles to Sinop Bay. There, Russian sailors actually discovered enemy ships anchored, but due to the advancing darkness could not determine the composition of the Turkish squadron.
Sinop Bay is a very convenient harbor, well protected from northern winds by the high Bostepe-Burun peninsula, connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. Before the start of the Crimean War, 10-12 thousand people lived in Sinop, mostly Turks and Greeks. On the shore of the bay there was an admiralty with good shipyards, port facilities, warehouses, and barracks. The Turks, being under the cover of coastal batteries and having a double superiority in forces, considered themselves safe and did not believe in the seriousness of the threat from a small Russian squadron. In addition, from hour to hour they expected the blockade to be broken from outside by the forces of a huge Anglo-French fleet.
On the night of November 8-9, a severe storm began, because of which Nakhimov was unable to carry out a detailed reconnaissance of the Sinop Bay the next day.
On November 10, the storm subsided, but on all ships many of the sails were torn by the wind, and on the battleships Svyatoslav and Brave and on the frigate Cahul the damage was so serious that urgent repairs were required at the base. On the evening of November 10, the damaged ships left for Sevastopol for repairs, and the Bessarabia steamer went for coal.
The next day, the Russian squadron consisting of the battleships "Empress Maria", "Chesma", "Rostislav" and the brig "Aeneas" again approached Sinop Bay and discovered a Turkish squadron consisting of seven frigates anchored in the roadstead under the protection of six coastal batteries. three corvettes, two steamships, two military transports and several merchant ships. The Turkish forces clearly outnumbered the Russian squadron, which had 252 cannons (the Turks had 476 cannons on ships and 44 on coastal batteries). These were the ships of the Turkish squadron of Osman Pasha, sheltered from the storm, heading to the Caucasian coast to participate in the landing in the Sukhum area; in mid-November, the landings, according to Turkish calculations, were supposed to facilitate the offensive of Turkish ground forces in the Caucasus. In addition to Osman himself, his chief adviser, the Englishman A. Slade, and the second flagship, Rear Admiral Hussein Pasha, were on the squadron.
Nakhimov established a blockade of Sinop Bay and sent a messenger ship, the brig Aeneas, to Sevastopol with a report of the detection and blocking of the enemy. In it, he wrote to Menshikov: “According to the review of a detachment of Turkish ships located in Sinop under the protection of 6 coastal batteries, I decided with the 84-gun ships “Empress Maria”, “Chesma” and “Rostislav” to closely blockade this port, waiting for ships from Sevastopol.” Svyatoslav" and "Brave"<...>in order to attack the enemy together with them." The 84-gun battleships "Empress Maria", "Chesma", "Rostislav" stood at the entrance to the bay, blocking the exit from it. The frigate "Kahul" took up an observation post a few miles from the bay .
On November 16, Nakhimov was joined by the squadron F.M. Novosilsky (battleships "Paris", "Grand Duke Constantine", "Three Saints"), and a little later the frigates "Kahul" and "Kulevchi" arrived. Now Nakhimov had at his disposal a squadron of eight warships with 720 guns on board. Thus, in terms of the number of guns, the Russian squadron surpassed the enemy squadron.
Since the Turkish squadron on the high seas could be reinforced by ships of the allied Anglo-French fleet, Nakhimov decided to attack and defeat it directly at the base.
His plan was to quickly (in a two-wake column) bring his ships into the Sinop roadstead, anchor them and resolutely attack the enemy from a short distance of 1-2 cables.
The day before the Sinop battle, Nakhimov gathered all the ship commanders and discussed the action plan with them. Let's quote him.
“Designing, at the first opportunity, to attack the enemy stationed in Sinop among 7 frigates, 2 corvettes, one sloop, two steamships and two transports, I have drawn up a disposition for attacking them and ask the commanders to anchor there and keep in mind the following:
1. When entering the roadstead, throw lots, because it may happen that the enemy will cross into shallow water, and then stand as close as possible to him, but at a depth of at least 10 fathoms.
2. Have a spring on both anchors; if, during an attack by the enemy, the wind N is the most favorable, then etch out 60 fathoms of chains, and have the same amount of springa previously laid on the bitenge; when sailing in a gybe in wind O or ONO, in order to avoid dropping the anchor from the stern, also stand on the spring, having it up to 30 fathoms, and when the chain, etched up to 60 fathoms, pulls, then veer out another 10 fathoms; in this case, the chain will weaken, and the ships will stand with their stern to the wind, on the cable; In general, be extremely careful with springs, because they often remain invalid due to the slightest inattention and delay of time.
3. Before entering the Gulf of Sinop, if the weather permits, in order to save the rowing ships on the rostra, I will make a signal to launch them at the side on the opposite side of the enemy, having on one of them, just in case, cables and a rope.
4. When attacking, be careful not to fire in vain at those ships that lower their flags; to send to take possession of them no other than on a signal from the admiral, trying to better use the time to defeat opposing ships or batteries, which, no doubt, would not stop firing if the matter with the enemy ships was over.
5. Now inspect the rivets of the chains; in case of need, rivet them
6. Open fire on the enemy at the second admiral’s shot, if before that there is no resistance from the enemy to our attack on them; otherwise, fire as best you can, taking into account the distance to enemy ships.
7. Having anchored and settled the spring, the first shots must be aimed; at the same time, it is good to note the position of the cannon wedge on the chalk cushion so that afterward the enemy will not be visible in the smoke, but you need to maintain rapid battle fire. It goes without saying that it should be aimed at the same position of the gun as during the first shots.
8. When attacking the enemy at anchor, it is good to have, as under sail, one officer on the main top or salinga to observe the direction of his shots during battle fire, and if they do not reach their target, the officer reports this to the quarterdeck for direction springa.
9. The frigates “Kahul” and “Kulevchi” will remain under sail during the operation to observe enemy steamers, which, without a doubt, will come under steam and harm our ships at their own discretion.
10. Having started business with enemy ships, try, if possible, not to harm the consular houses on which their consular flags will be raised.
In conclusion, I will express my idea that all preliminary instructions under changed circumstances can make it difficult for a commander who knows his business, and therefore I suggest that everyone completely independently act at their own discretion, but will certainly fulfill their duty. The Sovereign Emperor and Russia expect glorious exploits from the Black Sea Fleet. It's up to us to live up to expectations."
On the night of November 17-18, preparations began on the squadron for the upcoming battle. They ended at dawn. Despite the extremely unfavorable weather - rain and strong south-east wind, Nakhimov did not change his decision to attack the enemy in his harbor. At half past nine, a signal was raised on the flagship Empress Maria: “Prepare for battle and go to the Sinop roadstead.”
The battle itself began on November 30 (November 18), 1853, at 12:30 p.m. and lasted until 5:00 p.m. His squadron moved in two wake columns. The windward column included the battleships "Empress Maria" (84-gun) under the flag of Nakhimov, "Grand Duke Konstantin" (120-gun), "Chesma" (84-gun), in the leeward - the battleship "Paris" (120- cannon) under the flag of Novosilsky, "Three Saints" (120-gun), "Rostislav" (84-gun). Turkish naval artillery and coastal batteries subjected the attacking Russian squadron, which was entering the Sinop roadstead, to heavy fire. The enemy fired from a distance of 300 fathoms or less, but Nakhimov’s ships responded to the fierce enemy fire only by occupying advantageous positions. It was then that the complete superiority of Russian artillery became clear.
The battleship "Empress Maria" was bombarded with cannonballs - a significant part of its spars and rigging was destroyed, but the flagship went ahead, firing at the enemy and dragging the rest of the ships of the squadron with it. Directly opposite the Turkish flagship 44-gun frigate "Auni-Allah", at a distance of about 200 fathoms from it, the ship "Empress Maria" anchored and increased fire. The battle between the admiral's ships lasted for half an hour. Osman Pasha could not stand it: "Auni-Allah", having riveted the anchor chain, drifted to the western part of Sinop Bay and ran aground near coastal battery No. 6. The crew from the Turkish flagship fled to the shore. With the failure of the flagship frigate, the enemy squadron lost control.
After the defeat of the frigate "Auni-Allah", the flagship transferred its fire to the 44-gun Turkish frigate "Fazli-Allah" ("Given by Allah" - the Russian frigate "Raphael" captured in 1829). Soon this ship also caught fire and washed ashore not far from the central coastal battery No. 5. The Empress Maria turned around on the spring and began to fire at other Turkish ships that were fiercely resisting the Russian squadron.
On the battery decks of Russian ships, artillerymen acted harmoniously and skillfully, accurately hitting enemy ships. “The thunder of shots, the roar of cannonballs, the rollback of guns, the noise of people, the groans of the wounded,” recalled one of the participants in the battle, “everything mixed into one common hellish hubbub. The battle was in full swing.” The battleship "Grand Duke Konstantin", showered with a hail of cannonballs and grapeshot, anchored and, turning on the spring, opened strong fire on two 60-gun Turkish frigates "Navek-Bahri" and "Nesimi-Zefer". 20 minutes later the first frigate was blown up, and a friendly Russian “hurray” thundered over the bay. Once again turning around on the spring, the Grand Duke Konstantin opened fire on the Nesimi-Zefer and the 24-gun corvette Najimi-Feshan, and both of these ships, engulfed in flames, jumped ashore.
The battleship Chesma fired mainly at coastal batteries No. 3 and 4, which covered the left flank of the Turkish battle line. The gunners of the Russian ship accurately covered the targets and, one after another, disabled the guns on these batteries. Soon, an artillery duel between a Russian battleship and two Turkish coastal batteries ended in the complete defeat of the enemy: both batteries were destroyed, and some of their personnel were destroyed, and some fled to the mountains. The ships of the left column of the Russian squadron stood on the spring, matching the flagship and the battleship Paris. The commander of "Paris" is captain 1st rank Vladimir Ivanovich. Immediately after setting up the spring, Istomin opened heavy fire on the central coastal battery No. 5, on the 22-gun corvette Guli-Sefid and the 56-gun frigate Damiad. At 1 p.m. 15 minutes. As a result of well-aimed hits from Russian shells, the Turkish corvette took off into the air. The frigate Damiad, unable to withstand a fierce firefight with the battleship Paris, ran ashore. A long artillery duel took place between the gunners of the Paris and the gunners of the Turkish 64-gun, two-deck frigate Nizamiye, on which Rear Admiral Hussein Pasha, the second flagship of the enemy squadron, was located. At 2 p.m., the foremast and mizzen masts of the Nizamiye were shot down. Having lost many guns, the Turkish frigate left the battle line and stopped resistance.
Admiral Nakhimov closely monitored the actions of his ships. Observing the excellent combat work of the personnel of the battleship Paris, the admiral ordered a signal to be raised to express gratitude. However, it turned out to be impossible to carry out the order, since all the halyards on the flagship were broken. Then Nakhimov sent a boat with an adjutant under enemy fire. The battleship Rostislav, having taken a favorable position, opened fire on coastal battery No. 6, as well as on the frigate Nizamiye and the 24-gun corvette Feyzi-Meabud. After a heavy firefight, the Turkish corvette ran ashore, and the enemy battery was destroyed. The Three Saints fought with the 54-gun frigate Kaidi-Zefer, but in the midst of the battle on the Russian ship, one of the enemy shells broke the spring and the Three Saints began to turn into the wind with its stern towards the enemy. At this time, the enemy coastal battery intensified its fire, causing serious damage to the battleship. It was necessary to restore the spring at all costs. Midshipman Varnitsky rushed into the boat to repair the damage, but the boat was smashed by an enemy cannonball. The midshipman and the sailors jumped into another boat and, under continuous enemy artillery fire, corrected the spring and returned to the ship.
On the battleship Rostislav, one of the enemy shells hit the battery deck, tore apart the gun and caused a fire. The fire gradually approached the crew chamber, where the ammunition was stored. It was impossible to lose a single second, since the battleship was in danger of an explosion. At that moment, Lieutenant Nikolai Kolokoltsev rushed into the crew chamber, quickly closed the doors and, disregarding the danger, began to extinguish the fire of the curtain covering the hatches of the crew chamber exit. Kolokoltsev’s dedication saved the ship. Not only the gunners, but also all the other sailors of the Russian squadron played a huge role in achieving victory. Observers who were on the mars monitored the adjustment of fire, the hold workers and carpenters quickly and promptly sealed holes and corrected damage, shell carriers ensured an uninterrupted supply of ammunition to the guns, doctors bandaged the wounded on the battery decks, etc. The inspiration of all sailors during the battle was extremely great. The wounded refused to leave their combat posts.
The warships of the Turkish squadron stubbornly resisted, but not one of them could withstand the blow of the Russian squadron. Many Turkish officers shamefully fled from their ships during the battle (commander of the steamship Erekli Izmail Bey, commander of the corvette Feyzi-Meabud Itset Bey, etc.). An example was given to them by the chief adviser to Osman Pasha, the Englishman Adolph Slade. At about 2 p.m., the Turkish 22-gun steamer Taif, on which Mushaver Pasha was, broke away from the line of Turkish ships, which were suffering a severe defeat, and fled. Meanwhile, in the Turkish squadron, only this ship had 2 ten-inch bomb guns. Taking advantage of the Taif's speed advantage, Slade managed to escape the Russian ships and report to Istanbul about the complete destruction of the Turkish squadron. At 15 o'clock the battle ended. “The enemy ships, thrown ashore, were in the most disastrous condition,” Nakhimov reported. “I ordered to cease fire on them, although they did not lower their flags, as it turned out, from the panic that gripped the crews.”
In this battle, the Turks lost 15 of 16 ships and over 3 thousand people killed and wounded (out of 4,500 who took part in the battle); About 200 people were captured, including Osman Pasha, who was wounded in the leg, and the commanders of two ships. Admiral Nakhimov sent a truce to the shore to announce to the governor of Sinop that the Russian squadron had no hostile intentions towards the city, but the governor and the entire administration had long fled from the city. The losses of the Russian squadron amounted to 37 people killed and 233 wounded, 13 guns on the ships were hit and disabled, and there was serious damage to the hull, rigging and sails. "Empress Maria" received 60 holes, "Rostislav" - 45, "Three Saints" - 48, "Grand Duke Constantine" - 44, "Chesma" - 27, "Paris" -26.
After 16 hours, a detachment of steamers under the command of Vice Admiral Kornilov entered the bay. When approaching Sinop, Kornilov noticed the departing steamship Taif and ordered it to be intercepted. The steamship "Odessa" lay at the intersection of the "Taifa" course, but the latter did not accept the battle, despite the overwhelming superiority in artillery. Russian steamships entered the Sinop roadstead; their crews were entrusted with the task of towing Russian sailing ships away from the burning Turkish ships. The defeat of the Turkish squadron in the Battle of Sinop significantly weakened Turkey's naval forces and thwarted its plans to land its troops on the Caucasus coast.
Congratulating the squadron personnel on their victory, Admiral Nakhimov wrote in his order:
“The extermination of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by the squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet. I express my sincere gratitude to the second flagship, the commanders of the ships for the composure and precise ordering of their ships according to this disposition during strong enemy fire, and and for their unshakable courage in continuing the work itself. I address my gratitude to the officers for the undaunted and accurate performance of their duty, I thank the teams who fought like lions."
Having repaired the damage, the victors left deserted Sinop and headed for their native shores. However, some of the ships participating in the battle had to be towed all the way to Sevastopol by steamships that were part of Kornilov’s squadron. On November 2, 1853, the heroes were solemnly greeted by Sevastopol. The Nakhimov sailors were honored on the square near the Grafskaya pier, and the officers were honored at the Maritime Club. “The battle is glorious, higher than Chesma and Navarino... Hurray, Nakhimov! M.P. Lazarev rejoices at his student!” - another Lazarev student, Kornilov, wrote enthusiastically in those days. For the Sinop victory, Emperor Nicholas I awarded Vice Admiral Nakhimov the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, writing in a personal rescript: “By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you adorned the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.”
The Sinop naval battle was the last major battle in history of the era of the sailing fleet. Sailing ships began to be replaced by ships with steam engines. In the Battle of Sinop, the naval leadership talent of the outstanding Russian naval commander Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov clearly manifested itself. This is evidenced by the decisive actions of his squadron in destroying the enemy fleet in his base, the skillful deployment of ships and their use of 68-pound “bomb” guns installed on the lower battery decks of Russian battleships. The high moral and combat qualities of Russian sailors and the skillful management of combat operations by ship commanders are also indicative. The greater efficiency of "bomb" guns subsequently accelerated the transition to the creation of an armored fleet.
With the glorious victory in the Battle of Sinop, another heroic page was inscribed in the history of the famous victories of the Russian fleet won at Gangut, Ezel, Grengam, Chesma, Kaliakria, Corfu, Navarino. After this victory, the name of the outstanding Russian naval commander Nakhimov became known not only in our country, but also far beyond the borders of Russia.
Kabeltov - one tenth of a nautical mile, 185.2 m.
Spring is a device consisting of a rope (“cable”), the running end is inserted into the anchor chain, and the root end is fixed to a thick stern beam. Used to hold the ship in a certain position in relation to the wind or current.
Verp is an auxiliary anchor located in the stern of the ship.
F.M. Novosiltsev
“By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you decorated the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.” Emperor Nicholas I “Destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron consisting of...
“By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you decorated the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.”
Emperor Nicholas I
“The destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet.”
P. S. Nakhimov
December 1 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia. This is the day of the victory of the Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov over the Turkish squadron at Cape Sinop.
The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop on the Black Sea coast of Turkey on November 18 (30), 1853. The Turkish squadron was defeated within a few hours. The Battle of Cape Sinop was one of the major battles of the Crimean (Eastern) War, which began as a conflict between Russia and Turkey. Moreover, it went down in history as the last major battle of sailing fleets. Russia gained a serious advantage over the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire and dominance in the Black Sea (before the intervention of the great Western powers).
This naval battle became an example of the brilliant preparation of the Black Sea Fleet, led by one of the best representatives of the school of Russian military art. Sinop amazed all of Europe with the perfection of the Russian fleet and fully justified the many years of hard educational work of admirals Lazarev and Nakhimov.
A. P. Bogolyubov. Destruction of the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Sinop
Background
In 1853, another war between Russia and Turkey began. It led to a global conflict involving the world's leading powers. The Anglo-French squadron entered the Dardanelles. Fronts were opened on the Danube and in Transcaucasia. St. Petersburg, which was counting on a quick victory over the Porte, a decisive advancement of Russian interests in the Balkans and a successful solution to the problem of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, received the threat of war with the great powers, with vague prospects. There was a threat that the Ottomans, followed by the British and French, would be able to provide effective assistance to the Shamil mountaineers. This led to a new large-scale war in the Caucasus and a serious threat to Russia from the south.
In the Caucasus, Russia did not have enough troops to simultaneously hold back the advance of the Turkish army and fight the mountaineers. In addition, the Turkish squadron supplied the troops on the Caucasian coast with weapons and ammunition. Therefore, the Black Sea Fleet received two main tasks:
- urgently transport reinforcements from Crimea to the Caucasus;
- strike at enemy sea communications. Prevent the Ottomans from landing a large landing force on the eastern coast of the Black Sea in the Sukhum-Kale (Sukhumi) and Poti area to help the highlanders.
Pavel Stepanovich completed both tasks.
On September 13, an emergency order was received in Sevastopol to transfer an infantry division with artillery to Anakria (Anaklia). The Black Sea Fleet was in turmoil at that time. There were rumors about an Anglo-French squadron acting on the side of the Ottomans. Nakhimov immediately took over the operation. In four days, he prepared the ships and placed troops on them in perfect order: 16 battalions with two batteries (more than 16 thousand people), and all the necessary weapons and equipment. On September 17, the squadron went to sea and on the morning of September 24 arrived in Anakria. By evening the unloading was completed. The operation was considered brilliant; there were only a few sick people among the sailors and soldiers.
Having solved the first problem, Pavel Stepanovich proceeded to the second. It was necessary to disrupt the enemy landing operation. A 20 thousand Turkish corps was concentrated in Batumi, which was supposed to be transported by a large transport flotilla (up to 250 ships). The landing was to be covered by Osman Pasha's squadron.
At this time, the commander of the Crimean Army and the Black Sea Fleet was Prince Alexander Menshikov. He sent a squadron of Nakhimov and Kornilov to search for the enemy. On November 5 (17), V. A. Kornilov met the Ottoman 10-gun steamer Pervaz-Bahre, coming from Sinop. The steam frigate "Vladimir" (11 guns) under the flag of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Kornilov attacked the enemy. The battle was directly led by the commander of the Vladimir, Lieutenant Commander Grigory Butakov. He used the high maneuverability of his ship and noticed the weakness of the enemy - the absence of guns at the stern of the Turkish steamer. Throughout the battle I tried to stay in such a way as not to fall under Ottoman fire. The three-hour battle ended in Russian victory. This was the first battle of steam ships in history. Then Vladimir Kornilov returned to Sevastopol and ordered Rear Admiral F. M. Novosilsky to find Nakhimov and reinforce him with the battleships Rostislav and Svyatoslav, and the brig Aeneas. Novosilsky met with Nakhimov and, having completed the assignment, returned to Sevastopol.
Nakhimov and his detachment had been cruising between Sukhum and part of the Anatolian coast since the end of October, where the main port was Sinop. The vice admiral, after meeting with Novosiltsev, had five 84-gun ships: Empress Maria, Chesma, Rostislav, Svyatoslav and Brave, as well as the frigate Kovarna and the brig Aeneas. On November 2 (14), Nakhimov issued an order for the squadron, where he notified the commanders that in the event of a meeting with an enemy “superior to us in strength, I will attack him, being completely confident that each of us will do his job.”
Every day we waited for the enemy to appear. In addition, there was the possibility of meeting with British ships. But there was no Ottoman squadron. We only met Novosilsky, who brought two ships, replacing those battered by the storm and sent to Sevastopol. On November 8, a severe storm broke out, and the vice admiral was forced to send 4 more ships for repairs. The situation was critical. Strong winds continued after the storm on November 8th.
On November 11, Nakhimov approached Sinop and immediately sent a brig with the news that an Ottoman squadron was stationed in the bay. Despite significant enemy forces standing under the protection of 6 coastal batteries, Nakhimov decided to block Sinop Bay and wait for reinforcements. He asked Menshikov to send the ships “Svyatoslav” and “Brave”, the frigate “Kovarna” and the steamer “Bessarabia” sent for repairs. The admiral also expressed bewilderment why he was not sent the frigate "Kulevchi", which is idle in Sevastopol, and sent two more additional ships necessary for cruising. Nakhimov was ready to fight if the Turks made a breakthrough. However, the Turkish command, although at that time had an advantage in strength, did not dare to engage in a general battle or simply make a breakthrough. When Nakhimov reported that the Ottoman forces in Sinop, according to his observations, were higher than previously thought, Menshikov sent reinforcements - Novosilsky's squadron, and then a detachment of Kornilov's steamers.
The battle of the frigate Vladimir with the Turkish-Egyptian military steamer Pervaz-Bahri on November 5, 1853. A. P. Bogolyubov
Strengths of the parties
Reinforcements arrived on time. On November 16 (28), 1853, Nakhimov’s detachment was reinforced by the squadron of Rear Admiral Fyodor Novosilsky: 120-gun battleships “Paris”, “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Three Saints”, frigates “Kahul” and “Kulevchi”. As a result, under the command of Nakhimov there were already 6 battleships: the 84-gun “Empress Maria”, “Chesma” and “Rostislav”, the 120-gun “Paris”, “Grand Duke Constantine” and “Three Saints”, the 60-gun frigate “ Kulevchi" and the 44-gun "Kahul". Nakhimov had 716 guns; from each side the squadron could fire a salvo weighing 378 pounds 13 pounds. 76 guns were bomb guns, firing explosive bombs that had great destructive power. Thus, the Russian fleet had the advantage. In addition, Kornilov rushed to Nakhimov’s aid with three steam frigates.
The Turkish squadron included: 7 frigates, 3 corvettes, several auxiliary ships and a detachment of 3 steam frigates. In total, the Turks had 476 naval guns, supported by 44 coastal guns. The Ottoman squadron was led by the Turkish Vice Admiral Osman Pasha. The second flagship was Rear Admiral Hussein Pasha. There was an English adviser with the squadron - Captain A. Slade. The steamship detachment was commanded by Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha. The Turks had their advantages, the main ones being parking in a fortified base and the presence of steamships, while the Russians only had sailing ships.
Admiral Osman Pasha, knowing that the Russian squadron was guarding him at the exit from the bay, sent an alarming message to Istanbul, asking for help, significantly exaggerating Nakhimov’s forces. However, the Turks were late; the message was transmitted to the British on November 17 (29), a day before the attack of the Russian fleet. Even if Lord Stratford-Radcliffe, who at that time actually led the policy of the Porte, gave the order to the British squadron to go to the aid of Osman Pasha, help would still be late. Moreover, the British ambassador in Istanbul did not have the right to start a war with the Russian Empire; the admiral could refuse.
Nakhimov's plan
The Russian admiral, as soon as reinforcements arrived, decided not to wait, to immediately enter Sinop Bay and attack the enemy. In essence, Nakhimov was taking a risk, albeit a well calculated one. The Ottomans had good naval and coastal guns, and with appropriate leadership, the Turkish forces could inflict serious damage on the Russian squadron. However, the once formidable Ottoman navy was in decline, both in terms of combat training and leadership.
The Turkish command itself played along with Nakhimov, positioning the ships extremely inconveniently for defense. Firstly, the Ottoman squadron was positioned like a fan, a concave arc. As a result, the ships blocked the firing sector of part of the coastal batteries. Secondly, the ships were located right next to the embankment, which did not give them the opportunity to maneuver and fire on both sides. Thus, the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries could not fully resist the Russian fleet.
Nakhimov's plan was imbued with determination and initiative. The Russian squadron, in the formation of two wake columns (the ships followed one after another along the course line), received the order to break through to the Sinop roadstead and deliver a fire strike on the enemy ships and batteries. The first column was commanded by Nakhimov. It included the ships “Empress Maria” (flagship), “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Chesma”. The second column was led by Novosilsky. It included “Paris” (2nd flagship), “Three Saints” and “Rostislav”. The movement in two columns was supposed to reduce the time it took for ships to pass under the fire of the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries. In addition, it was easier to deploy Russian ships into battle formation when anchored. In the rearguard were frigates, which were supposed to stop the enemy’s attempts to escape. The targets of all ships were distributed in advance.
At the same time, ship commanders had a certain independence in choosing targets, depending on the specific situation, while implementing the principle of mutual support. “In conclusion, I will express the idea,” Nakhimov wrote in the order, “that all preliminary instructions under changed circumstances can make it difficult for a commander who knows his business, and therefore I allow everyone to act completely independently at their own discretion, but will certainly fulfill their duty.”